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Introduction
“This is something that, every time I think about
it, I imagine how could human kind become
dependent on something that is going to finish
some day? This is stupidity. I can’t understand
why. How could, in less than 50 years, because it
was in the first half of the 20th century, the whole
human kind became dependent on something
that is going to be eliminated….Each country can
(now) have its own ‘oil deposits.’” 
(Hon. R. Rodrigues, Minister of Agriculture, Bra-
zil 2006.)
Brazil’s rise to be the world’s preeminent bioenergy pro-
ducer provides three important lessons. The first lesson is
about the complex task for developing countries balancing
government intervention with market forces as they try to
develop an industry. The second is how critical research
and development (R&D) is for lowering costs to allow for
market entry of an infant industry. The third is about the
new challenges for bioenergy as it increasingly competes
with the food industry for the same raw materials. 
The Industry
Increases in petroleum prices and demand are creating
pressure to develop new sources of renewable energies.
Biofuel will represent 30% of the global energy used by
2020 compared with only 2% today (International Energy
Agency, 2005). In 2004, the global ethanol market was
US$30-40 billion, of which $4 billion involved interna-
tional trade. Brazil, China, India, Malaysia and South
Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union
(EU) are important players in the burgeoning global mar-
ket. Brazil is one of the world’s most competitive biofuels
producers because of its comparative advantage in produc-
ing ethanol and soybeans. The US, the 2nd leading ethanol
producer in the world, has variable costs of production of
corn-based ethanol of US$0.96 per gallon.  Fixed costs
range from US$1.05 to US$3.00 per gallon. While in Bra-
zil the total cost of production was approximately
US$1.10 per gallon during the 2005 crop year, with vari-
able costs of US$.89 per gallon and fixed costs of US$.21
per gallon. In early 2006, the wholesale price paid to the
mills for anhydrous ethanol was US$2.05 per gallon, while
the retail price at the time for ethanol-gasoline blends was
US$3.41 (including taxes).
Total world ethanol production (all grades) in 2005
was 12.2 billion of gallons, with 70% of this total pro-
duced by the US and Brazil (Figure 1). Other significant

































Figure 1. Leading ethanol producing nations, 2000 –
2005.
Sources: Renewable Fuels Association. Ethanol Industry Outlook 2006. 
Available online: http://www.ethanolrfa.org/.
F.O. LICHT. (2006). International sugar & sweetener report. Several Reports.
UNICA, União da Agroindústria Canavieira de São Paulo. (2006). Estatísti-
cas. Available online: http://www.unica.com.br.92 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
US started to grow rapidly in the mid
1990s, while expansion in Brazil has
been most active since 2000 (Figure
2). Between 2000 and 2005, world
production has grown at a rate of
13% per year. In 2004/05, Brazil was
the world’s largest producer of sugar-
cane, sugar, and ethanol with 34%,
19%, and 37%, respectively, of world
production. Today, real ethanol
prices in Brazil are less than one-third
of what they were in 1975. 
In 2004, over 350,000 flex-fuel
cars were sold in Brazil (ANFAVEA,
2006) (Figure 3). This amounted to
16.1% of the market, a 500%
increase from 2003. In 2005, flex-
fuel car sales jumped again to approx-
imately 800,000, or 38% of the cars
sold. 
In 2005, the EU started to
require a 2% blend of ethanol in
their gasoline. This proportion will
increase to 5.75% by 2010. Sweden,
an importer of Brazilian ethanol,
now offers consumers a 20% tax
break to purchase flex-fuel cars, spe-
cial parking privileges, and no con-
gestion charge for urban flex-fuel
drivers. New laws to be passed in
Japan will require that 3% of ethanol
will be added to the gasoline. This
means that a new market of 0.45 bil-
lion gallons/year will be created if
this Japanese law is passed. Germany
intends to add 2% in its gasoline.
Negotiations are also evolving with
China for ethanol exports from Bra-
zil. 
This tremendous export potential
has stimulated investment in infra-
structure for transporting ethanol
from the production areas to major
ports in Brazil. A US$200 million
ethanol pipeline from the interior of
the State of Sao Paulo to Rio de Jan-
eiro (1,000 miles) is currently under
construction for export purposes by
the Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. 
There are currently around 330
operating mills producing ethanol,
with another 89 planned (Unica,
2006). In Brazil during the 2005
crop year, more than half of the total
sugarcane production was used for
ethanol production. Use of 10% eth-
anol blends reduces greenhouse gas
emissions by 12-19% compared with
conventional gasoline and reduces
tailpipe carbon monoxide emissions
by as much as 30% (Wang, Saricks,
& Santini, 1999). Since 2002, regu-
lar gasoline has contained 25% anhy-
drous ethanol, but in March, 2006
the percentage was decreased to 20%
due to short supplies and strong
domestic demand.
All agribusiness exports, includ-
ing ethanol and sugar have grown










































































































































































































































Figure 2. Sugarcane, sugar, and ethanol production in Brazil, 1975/76-2004/05.
Source: UNICA, União da Agroindústria Canavieira de São Paulo. (2006). Estatísticas. Available online: 
http://www.unica.com.br.
Figure 3. Fuel type of Brazilian car sales (1979-2004).
Source: ANFAVEA, Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores. (2006). Available 
online: http://www.anfavea.com.br/.2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2) CHOICES 93
trade policy. Brazil exports more than
50% of its sugar, oranges, coffee, and
soybeans. Ethanol exports have
increased rapidly to over 15% of pro-
duction.  For many nations, the size
and stability of domestic consump-
tion has been critical in the develop-
ment of export markets. The rise of
the ethanol industry in Brazil may be
due to the reverse. Its long history as
a leading sugar producer and
exporter has lead to the development
of a dynamic domestic cane-based
ethanol industry.  A new found
domestic demand for ethanol com-
plements the scale and global com-
petitiveness of Brazil’s sugar industry.
This gives the sugar complex a solid
domestic and international market
foundation by which to grow and
develop.
In March 2006, the country’s fuel
blenders (e.g., BR (Petrobras), Shell,
Exxon, Ipiranga) had to cut the etha-
nol content to 20% of its blended
fuel because of ethanol shortages.
Sugar prices were at their highest lev-
els in five years, as was the ratio
between sugar and ethanol prices.
The competition for inputs between
energy and food sectors is wonderful
news for processors as they now are
able to sell into either of two very
high demand markets, sugar and eth-
anol. But, the competition raises
important public policy issues if
energy demand limits critical food or
feedstuffs. 
Supply is responding, but mostly
in the eastern part of the country.
Poor transportation and infrastruc-
ture, longer distances to export ter-
minals, and smaller local markets in
the Center-West region make invest-
ment less appealing. The State of Sao
Paulo though is in a unique situation
to benefit from the country’s com-
mitment to ethanol. It has a long his-
tory of being a leader in sugarcane
production, fuel processing, and
automobile manufacturing. Special
sugarcane varieties have been devel-
oped and perform well in Sao Paulo’s
climate. The topography is condu-
cive to mechanized harvesting.
Finally, Sao Paulo benefits from some
of the best infrastructure in the coun-
try. Because of the tremendous inter-
est to build mills in Sao Paulo, the
value of land has risen considerably.
A 1.5mmt sugar mill will need
around 27,000 hectares of sugarcane
no more than 40 kilometers from the
mill. In the western part of the State
of Sao Paulo, land in June 2002 was
selling for US$1,350/hectare. By
June 2005, land was selling for
US$3,070/hectare.
Brazilian consumers have added
to the problem of short supply as
they have aggressively purchased the
flex-fuel cars. Consumers only buy
ethanol if the pump price is 30%
below gasoline blends. For the first
quarter of 2006, retail pump prices
for ethanol and gasoline approached
parity in Sao Paulo, forcing some
consumers back to gasoline.  Tech-
nology allows consumers to be very
astute about their purchases and
adapt consumption very quickly. The
challenge is for the distribution sys-
tem to match the dynamics of the
market. 
History
The first investment in ethanol dates
back to the 1920s. The Instituto do
Açúcar e do Álcool (IAA) was estab-
lished in the 1930s and state inter-
vention regulated sugarcane activity
in Brazil until the 1980s. Ethanol
production though was a minor
activity in Brazil until the 1970s
when the sharp rise in oil prices
threatened the military dictatorship’s
ability to rule. At the time 90% of
the gasoline was imported, causing
fuel shortages, inflation, current
account deficits, and diminished
hard currency reserves. By 1975,
sugar prices fell sharply in the inter-
national market. At the same time,
oil importing countries suffered from
significant price hikes (from
US$2.91/barrel in September 1973
to US$12.45/barrel by March 1974).
Brazilian imports and balance of pay-
ments accounts were strongly
impacted by this oil price increase,
leading the government to launch the
Proalcool program at the end of
1975. The purpose of the new pro-
gram was to stimulate domestic fuel
ethanol supply obtained from cane
biomass by means of aggressive mar-
ket intervention through quotas,
marketing orders, price setting, and
subsidized interest rates. 
The second oil shock in 1979
brought about new Proalcool activi-
ties focused on demand expansion
for hydrated ethanol. A system of tax
exemptions for buyers of ethanol cars
and consumer pricing fixing that
pegged ethanol to gasoline prices
were put in place. Additional activi-
ties integrated ethanol production for
the first time into its energy planning
process. Brazil’s National Energy
Commission expanded the ethanol
production target to 3.8 billion gal-
lons as a result of growing domestic
needs. 
T h r o u g h o u t  m u c h  o f  L a t i n
America sweeping market-based
reforms, called the Washington Con-
sensus, occurred in the mid 1980s as
a result of the deteriorating financial
state and hyperinflation that had
overrun the region. In Brazil, govern-
ment spending controls were needed
because of the high level of accumu-
lated national debt. The need for eth-
anol became less compelling as oil
prices declined. 
In 1987 Petrobras, the state-
owned oil and gasoline company, was
no longer obliged to buy all the fuel94 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
ethanol produced by the sector. In
1988, the Brazilian Constitution fun-
damentally changed the State's eco-
nomic planning role from being nor-
mative to indicative. In 1990 the
IAA, the public institution through
which government intervention had
been executed for about 60 years, was
eliminated (MP - Medida Provisória
no. 151, March 15, 1990). In 1993,
the government passed a law in
which all gasoline marketed in Brazil
would be blended with 20% to 25%
of ethanol. 
Sugarcane prices, including
freight to mills and distilleries, and
all ethanol prices were deregulated
and determined by market forces
starting January 1, 1997 (Portaria no.
64, March 1996). Producers are now
paid through a formula based on the
sugarcane’s end use, either sugar or
ethanol. The Organização dos Plan-
tadores de Cana do Estado de Sao
Paulo – ORPLANA (producers) and
the União da Agroindústria Canavi-
eira de São Paulo – UNICA (mills)
agreed in 1999 on a voluntary, non-
profit sugarcane payment system cal-
led CONSECANA-SP (Conselho
dos Productores de Cana-de-Acucar,
Acucar e Alcool do Esatdo de Sao
Paulo-Consecana).  
In 1997, the Cane, Sugar, and
Ethanol Official Harvest Plan was
published for the last time by the
Brazilian government (Portaria no.
46, May 1997). The 40% tariff quo-
tas for sugar exports were eliminated
and market-based prices for anhy-
drous ethanol became effective May
1, 1997. By 1999, price deregulation
for cane and hydrated ethanol was
also in place. In 2003, the Brazilian
automobile industry launched the
first flex-fuel car. Consumers now
could decide the mix proportion at
every fill-up: pure gasoline, pure eth-
anol, or a blend.  The tax rate at the
retail level in January 2006 for pure
gasoline was 52.12%. This was 58%
higher than the tax on pure hydrated
ethanol. The anhydrous ethanol,
which is used to blend with gasoline,
is untaxed. Thus, the gasoline
blended with 13% or more anhy-
drous benefits from a lower tax level
when compared to hydrated ethanol.
An 80:20 blend would have an effec-
tive tax rate of 22%.
R&D Investment 
The sustained capacity to improve
and diversify its production by
investing in R&D is one of the most
important factors underlying the suc-
cess and growth of Brazil’s sugar/eth-
anol complex. Sugarcane productiv-
ity has risen steadily at a 2.3%
growth rate between 1975 and 2004.
Yields are now over 80 tons/hectare.
Industrial productivity growth is not
as brisk, increasing on average 1.17%
since 1975.
This growth rate is the result of
new variety development, biological
pest control introduction, improved
management, and greater soil selec-
tively. These efforts were initiated by
the Sao Paulo state government’s the
Instituto Agronômico de Campinas
(IAC) and Instituto Biológico. By
1970, Copersucar, a private coopera-
tive of sugar and cane producers, cre-
ated a Center for Technological
Research. This research center was
instrumental in the expansion of sug-
arcane production and the industrial
development of the sector. In 1971
the federal government created the
Programa Nacional de Melhora-
mento da Cana-de-Açúcar (Planalsu-
car) with a particular focus on the
development of new sugarcane vari-
eties.  Planalsucar was created to
reduce the technology growth rate
difference between industry and pro-
duction within the Brazilian cane
sector (Figure 4). With industry
developing faster, an agricultural pro-
duction lag could eventually result in
bottlenecks for sugar and ethanol
producers. In the 1990s though, the
Brazilian government decided to
close Planalsucar, as part of its adjust-
ment plan to reduce the size and role
of government.  
Copersucar (now the Center for
Sugarcane Technology (Centro de
Tecnologia Canavieira)) invested
about 1% of its total revenue back
into research related to sugarcane and
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Figure 4. Sugarcane and ethanol productivity in Brazil, 1975-2004.
1975=100. Source: Centro de Tecnologia Canavieira, 2006 and authors’ calculations.2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2) CHOICES 95
and 1990s. The State of Sao Paulo
made substantial investments in basic
research and molecular genetics
(ONSA - SUCEST genome project)
and a US$8 million investment in a
sugarcane breeding improvement
project (FAPESP – Fundação de
Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São
Paulo). Work with transgenic sugar-
cane is also being conducted, but the
legislation necessary for greater com-
mercialization has not been evolving
at the same pace as the research.
Government’s Current Role
The government’s current role is not
only much smaller, but quite differ-
ent as well. Most of the government’s
efforts today are to ensure that the
transformation to a market-driven
sector proceeds smoothly and to help
improve the industry’s environmental
performance.
Some minor traditional interven-
tionist policies remain. For example,
cane producers in the North-North-
eastern (NNE) states are still paid a
subsidy (R$5.7 or 19%) to offset
their higher cost of production. This
transfer is maintained to equalize
costs and slow migration to the Cen-
ter-South (CS) states. 
Government indirectly affects
cane, sugar, and ethanol prices
received by producers through excise
taxes. The ICMS (Imposto sobre Cir-
culação de Mercadorias e Serviços)
tax is an interstate tax that varies by
state and serves to generate state reve-
nue. ICMS taxes are levied when
production and utilization occur in
different states. Excise tax differences
cause illegal tax avoidance as sales are
“booked” to a low tax state (e.g.,
Minas Gerais), but actually sold in a
higher tax state (Sao Paulo). As a
result, states have an incentive to
homogenize their excise tax rates to
keep sales “in-state.”
The IPI (Imposto sobre Produtos
Industrializados) is a federal excise
tax applied to industrialized prod-
ucts. It is currently set at 5% of sugar
prices received by producers and has
not been considered a factor that
causes resource reallocation between
regions or states.
Two new market-oriented insti-
tutions are CIMA (Conselho Inter-
ministerial do Açúcar e do Álcool)
established in August 1997 and ANP
(Agência Nacional do Petróleo)
established in August 1997.  CIMA
involves representatives from ten fed-
eral government secretaries who
monitor and evaluate the deregula-
tion process as the sector moves to a
free market. ANP serves as overseer
of the new oil derivatives market.  
The most active area for the gov-
ernment has to do with regulating
the industry’s environmental impact
and helping the industry develop
energy co-products from waste mate-
rial (bagasse). Activities that are con-
trolled include: sugarcane field burn-
ing; bagasse (post-processing residual
material) management; soil quality;
herbicides and insecticides storage
and usage; liquid waste application
for fertilizer, forest preservation, sur-
face and ground water quality, etha-
nol storage; water usage; sugarcane
transport (weight and volume); and
noise pollution. 
One of the most harmful envi-
ronmental effects from sugarcane
production is the burning of fields to
facilitate manual harvesting. Burn-
ing is conducted prior to harvesting
to eliminate pests and remove weeds.
This makes movement through the
field safer and easier, but produces
significant quantities of greenhouse
gases, ash, and other airborne partic-
ulates. Absolute elimination of burn-
ing has proven difficult so a schedule
was established to gradually reduce
the burning over the next 20 years in
Sao Paulo, the largest production
region. In 2000, additional steps
were taken to eliminate burning and
shift practices over to mechanized
harvesting (Law no. 10.547, March
5, 2000). The new law specifically
established where burning was pro-
hibited and mechanization in turn
would be used; about 55% of pro-
duction. It also established rules
where burning would be allowed;
45% of production. Burning is still
permitted where the ground is sloped
12% or more, making mechanized
harvesting impossible; or where small
landholders were involved and had
no other means of harvesting.
Two controversial outcomes of
these environmental policies are the
immediate unemployment of over
100,000 of the nation’s 1.2 million
seasonal sugarcane workers and the
creation of incentives for producers
to relocate their farms to avoid regu-
lation. The loss of jobs is important
because the sugarcane workers are
some of the most at-risk elements of
rural Brazil. Politically it is difficult
for Brazil’s president, Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva, who came to office as a
very strong advocate for the country’s
disenfranchised workers. 
The sugarcane harvest area in
Brazil is around 5.2 million hectares
(UNICA, 2006) and employs 1.2
million workers (Parra, 2005). With
the new burning law, approximately
2.9 million hectares (55% of total
cane acreage) will be mechanically
harvested.  Each combine harvests
around 1,300 hectares per year and
replaces 60 seasonal workers. This
means that the 2,231 combines will
displace about 134,000 workers, or
11% of the sector’s labor force. 
Production migration too is of
great concern because land is plenti-
ful in Brazil and regulatory oversight
is weak. So, environmental regulation
may be having the perverse effect of96 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
increasing pollution in the short run
as production expands in new regions
where environmental regulations are
weak and monitoring is difficult. 
The Brazilian energy sector is
undergoing a restructuring process
due to deregulation that has evolved
since the beginning of the 1990s.
One important implication for the
sugarcane sector came about in Sep-
tember 1996, when Decree no. 2003
allowed independent producers to
commercialize co-generated electric
energy.  
In the Brazilian sugarcane sector,
the energy generated by bagasse
burning is used for cane processing.
However, many sugar mills, particu-
larly in Sao Paulo, have the capacity
to produce energy above their own
needs that can be sold in the market.
An analysis presented by the Secre-
taria de Energia of Sao Paulo suggests
that approximately 28% of the sugar-
cane weight in the form of bagasse
can be transformed into ethanol
(Souza and Burnquist, 2000;
Queiroz, and Ribeiro, 2002). The
processing of one ton of sugarcane
produces about 260kg of bagasse,
with 13% dry fiber and 50% average
moisture. About 5kg of steam is
obtained from each kg of burned
fiber. The current price paid for
energy obtained from this source is
low relative to the cost of new con-
struction.
The current installed capacity to
produce co-generated energy by the
sugarcane sector in the Brazilian
Southeast is estimated at 619MW
with another 205MW of expansion
capacity. This would be enough
power to provide electricity to
700,000, or 2% of the State’s residen-
tial needs. The overall energy genera-
tion by the sugarcane sector repre-
sents a total of 995MW, which
corresponds to only 1.32% of the
overall installed energy capacity in
the country.  An important advan-
tage for the energy supplied by the
sugarcane sector is that its seasonal
production matches the countries'
needs. During the "dry" months
(June - August) sugarcane production
and processing is at its peak when
water reservoirs are at their lowest
levels and the nation’s hydro-electric
system is least efficient. There is the
potential using existing technology to
produce 4.02GW if value added
taxes (ICMS) could be reduced and
electricity prices were allowed to
approach market levels (Eletrobras,
2004). 
Conclusion
The opening quotation by Brazil’s
agricultural minister, Mr. Rodrigues,
captures the enthusiasm and com-
mitment to bioenergy. Investment
and expansion will continue as sup-
ply tries to catch up with demand.
Brazil’s leading airplane manufac-
t u r e r ,  E m b r a e r  i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  b e
exploring the use of ethanol as a sub-
stitute for jet fuel. Brazil’s global
strategy is focused on building basic
demand in Asia and Europe. Entic-
ing customers in Asia to switch to
ethanol would give significant credi-
bility to the fuel. It would help entice
other large sugar producers, both
within and outside of Brazil, to shift
their mills over to ethanol processing.
Also of importance are potential new
opportunities for low-latitude under-
developed countries to expand
exports.
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